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I NSIDE

M ACHINE :
C ONSTITUTIONALITY OF I NDIA’S
S URVEILLANCE A PPARATUS
THE

Bedavyasa Mohanty†

I. I NTRODUCTION
on June 6, 2013, The Guardian published a leaked top secret order of
the American Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (hereinafter “FISA
Court”).1 The secret court order mandated the production of call details of
all Verizon subscribers to the National Security Agency (hereinafter “NSA”).
This marked the beginning of what has been called the ‘biggest intelligence
leak in the history of the world’. Few other revelations in the recent past have
caused an unprecedented global outrage like that which followed edward
Snowden’s leak of NSA’s classified documents. The practice of a State monitoring its citizens’ activities has been in existence for centuries. 2 yet, laws
governing surveillance and interception of communications have never been
subjected to as much debate within the civil society as they have been in the
last decade. This upsurge can in part be attributed to an increasing ease in
modern communication and, resultantly, a resurgence of what Mill called
the “marketplace of ideas”3 on the internet.4 In part, however, the growing
dialogue is attributable to disenchantment with increasingly oppressive State
practices.5 With rapid growth in technology, there has been an expansion in
†
1

2
3
4

5

Junior Fellow, Cyber Initiative, observer Research Foundation
In Re Application of the Federal Bureau of investigation for an order requiring the production of tangible things from Verizon Business Network Services Inc. on behalf of
MCI Communication Services, Inc. D/B/A Verizon Business Services, BR 13-80, Foreign
Intelligence and Surveillance Court, available at https://epic.org/privacy/nsa/Section-215order-to-Verizon.pdf
See generally, L.N. Rangarajan, Kautilya: The Arthashastra 522-524 (1992).
John S. Mill, on Liberty (1859).
See generally Law Reform Commission (Ireland), Report on Privacy: Surveillance
and Interception of Communications (1998) available at http://www.lawreform.ie/_
fileupload/Reports/rPrivacy.htm.
Glenn Greenwald, No Place to hide: edward Snowden, the NSA and the
Surveillance State 6 (2014).
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the State’s capabilities for supervision over the activities of its citizens. There
has, however, not been a complementary augmentation in the safeguards for
citizens’ rights. Unauthorised interception of communication is indicative of
a blatant disregard for the right to privacy available to every person. This
becomes doubly relevant in the Indian context where the contours of the law
of privacy are still being defined.
The right to privacy, having found no specific protection under any legislation has had to evolve through decades of contradictory pronouncements by Indian courts.6 however, with every additional buttress for the
protection of the right to privacy, there has been the introduction of a rule
or law to restrict its application. The Indian government has been putting
into operation newer tools for restricting freedoms while the laws governing
their application remain archaic and draconian. In a manner reminiscent of
the Foucaldian Panopticon,7 the citizen is made aware of the existence of
these tools while the extent of their reach into one’s personal life remains
shrouded in mystery.
This paper seeks to analyse the nuances of some of these laws and tools
that enable the State to keep a constant watch over its citizens’ activities. It
also attempts to test the validity of the State’s surveillance powers against
the principles of liberty and justice enshrined in the Indian Constitution.
In doing so, the author aims to challenge the archaic foundations of Indian
surveillance laws while drawing attention to areas that are in need of re-examination or, in some cases, complete overhaul. Part II of the paper is a brief
exposition of the various laws and rules currently in effect that enable the
State to intercept communications. This part aims to highlight the systemic
shortcomings that are common to all legislations pertaining to surveillance.
Part III traces the development of these laws across modern history in an
attempt to unearth and examine the bases of the power of interception. This
exercise aims to bring to light the severe lack of legislative discourse that
surveillance laws have been subjected to in India. It also seeks to highlight
the dire necessity of immediate legislative re-examination of these laws. Part
IV attempts to explore the incongruity between the powers of interception of
communications and the fundamental freedoms assured in the Constitution.
6

7

For the development of the right to privacy in India, see generally Kharak Singh v. State
of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1295; R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 1 SCC 471 :
AIR 1973 SC 157; Gobind v. State of M.P., (1975) 2 SCC 148 : AIR 1975 SC 1378; R.
Rajagopal v. State of T.N., (1994) 6 SCC 632 : AIR 1995 SC 264; People’s Union for Civil
Liberties v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301 : AIR 1997 SC 568; Naz Foundation v.
Govt. of NCT of Delhi, 2009 SCC onLine Del 1762 : (2009) 160 DLT 277; Selvi v. State
of Karnataka, (2010) 7 SCC 263.
Michel Foucalt, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 201 (1975).
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It contends that surveillance in its current form may not constitute a reasonable restriction envisaged under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. Part
V examines the unfeasibility in implementation of these laws and explores
their shortcomings that inhibit the actualisation of constitutional goals. Part
VI looks at similar laws and rules in force in other developing and developed
nations. These include countries that have traditionally been proactive in
delineating the contours of privacy laws and countries that have followed
a comparable timeline in democratic development since their independence
in the 20th Century. This part highlights surveillance practices followed in
these countries that can feasibly be adapted to an Indian context to make
our laws more progressive. The scope of this paper is limited to the examination of the substantive principles allowing the State to intercept communications and it does not attempt an in-depth analysis of the rules of procedure
governing the same. This is due to the fact that procedural aspects of surveillance laws have attained relative clarity after the judgment in People’s Union
for Civil Liberties v. Union of India.8

II. LEGISLATIONS

GOVERNING SURVEILLANCE

Any attempt at evaluating the surveillance regime in India must begin with
an assessment of laws that empower the State to intercept communications.
Communication in the modern context predominantly relates to messages
transmitted via the telecommunication networks.9 All licensing agreements
entered into between the State and internet/telecommunications service providers contain provisions which enable the State to intercept users’ communications.10 however, the fountainhead from which the State derives its
powers of interception is the triumvirate of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885,
the Indian Post office Act, 1898 and the Information Technology Act, 2000.
These legislations along with various rules drafted thereunder serve as the
enabling statutes for State surveillance. This part details the provisions that
authorise interception of communications and discusses the factors common
to all three laws.
8
9
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People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301 : AIR 1997 SC 568.
Teodor Serbanescu, Personal Communication available at https://www.wpi.edu/Pubs/eproject/Available/e-project-090311-151245/unrestricted/Personal_Communication_IQP.
pdf (Last visited on Aug. 18, 2016).
See Clause 41.1, Unified Access Service License, Department of Telecommunication,
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, available at http://www.dot.gov.in/sites/
default/files/Unified%20Licence.pdf (Last visited on Aug. 18, 2016); Clause 39.12 Unified
Licence, Department of Telecommunication, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting,
available at http://www.dot.gov.in/sites/default/files/Unified%20Licence.pdf (Last visited
on Aug. 18, 2016).
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A. Indian Telegraph Act, 1885
For the surveillance of telephone networks, the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885
(hereinafter “the Act”) serves as the primary enabling statute. The term
“telegraph” as defined under §3(1AA) of the Act is broad and expansive. It
includes “any appliance, instrument, material or apparatus used or capable
of use for transmission or reception of signs, signals, writing, images and
sounds or intelligence of any nature by wire, visual or other electromagnetic
emissions, radio waves or hertzian waves, galvanic, electric or magnetic
means.”11 This is a “broad and future-proof definition”12 which brings all
communication devices into the ambit of the Act.
§5 of the Act authorises the State to intercept and detain telegraphs and
telegraphic communication. It also lays down conditions under which the
power of interception can be exercised. §5(2) which enables interception of
telegraphic articles can only be used on the occurrence of a “public emergency” or in the interest of “public safety”. Further, it must also be established that the interception is necessary or expedient in the interests of
sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations
with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence. The power under §5 has been vested with an administrative official authorised by the Central or State Government.

B. Rule 419A, Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951
Rule 419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules lays down detailed procedure for
intercepting communications. Under sub-rule (1) an order for lawful interception must normally be passed by the Secretary to the Government of India
in the Ministry of home Affairs in the case of Government of India and by
the Secretary to the State Government in-charge of the home Department
in the case of a State Government. Under exigent circumstances though,
the power of interception may also be used by an officer not below the
rank of a joint secretary who has been authorised by the government. Rule
419A clarifies that an order of interception may only be passed where other
methods of obtaining the information have been tried and have failed. The
Rule stipulates that any order permitting tapping of communication would
lapse (unless renewed) in two months. In no case would tapping be permissible beyond 180 days. The Rule further requires all records of tapping to
11
12

Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, §3 (1AA).
Software Freedom Law Centre, India’s Surveillance State(2014), available at
http://sflc.in/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/SFLC-FINAL-SURVeILLANCe-RePoRT.
pdf (Last visited on Aug. 18, 2016).
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be destroyed after a period of two months from the lapse of the period of
interception.

C. Indian Post Office Act, 1898
§26 of the Indian Post office Act is analogous to §5 of the Indian Telegraph
Act and governs the interception of postal communication. Not unlike the
Telegraph Act, the power of interception of postal articles is also vested with
an executive authority authorised by the government to do so. Most modern
communication takes place over the internet and telecommunication networks. Due to this reason, interception provisions under the Post office Act
have been rendered all but irrelevant in the 21st Century. however in the
hundred sixteen years of its existence the Act has been the subject of many
controversial claims of being used for political subversion.13

D. Information Technology Act, 2000
Drafted in the year 2000, the Information Technology Act is the first legislation that governs and regulates information transmitted via computer
networks. §69 of the Act is also modelled extensively along the lines of §5(2)
of the Telegraph Act. §69, however, does away with the requirements of
the existence of a public emergency and interest of public safety. Instead it
adds defence of India and investigation of any offence as additional grounds
under which communication may be intercepted. Further, §69 also imposes
an obligation on private entities, like internet service providers to render
assistance to intercepting authorities failing which, they may be punished
with imprisonment up to seven years.

E. Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards
for Interception, Monitoring and Decryption of
Information) Rules, 2009
The Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception,
Monitoring and Decryption of Information) Rules are similar to the Rule
419A of the Indian Telegraph Rules. The only major distinction between the
two sets of rules is that while Rule 419A allows interception of communication relating to a person or a class of persons, the IT Rules additionally allow
13

Prabhu Chawla, Postal censorship: Storm in the letterbox, India Today, Aug. 31, 1981,
available at http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/delhi-police-intercept-read-and-re-postmails-of-264-persons/1/402130.html (an examination of the list of persons whose communications were intercepted reveals that the majority of them were people who were
considered political opponents of Mrs. Indira Gandhi) (Last visited on Aug. 18, 2016).
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interception of communication relating to a subject matter. The relevance of
this departure is discussed in the subsequent sections of this paper.

III. H ISTORICAL A NTECEDENT

OF

§5(2)

Surveillance for gathering and controlling information has long been a
prevalent practice among Indian statesmen. The Arthashastra speaks of the
ruler surreptitiously gathering intelligence for stifling dissent and identifying
rebels.14 other historic texts evidence the practice of installing ambassadors
and hermits for gathering intelligence from foreign lands and communal
places respectively.15 The Mughals are credited with being among the first
to institutionalise this system. They favoured gathering political intelligence
through a comprehensive network of post offices called dakchaukis that
were manned by a State official.16 These early attempts at an institutionalised system of intelligence gathering, however, were not meant to create
a police State. The primary motivation for intercepting communications in
pre-colonial India was to detect “moral transgressions among their officers
and the oppression of the weak by the powerful.”17 The rulers also used this
information to obtain practical insights into the financial conditions of their
taxpayers.18 In essence, surveillance systems in ancient and modern India
were used not for prevention and detection of crime. They were meant to
ensure better administration and better allocation of resources.
evidence suggests that the practice of information gathering through
interception of communication carried over to Colonial India as well.19
however, the British interest in observing and controlling the flow of information within India was different from the rulers that came before them.
The raison d’être behind surveillance under the Crown was limited largely
to protection of military intelligence and dissemination of British propaganda. 20 This was accomplished by the deputation of two army officials as
the Chief Telegraph Censor and the Chief Postal Censor under the Director

14
15
16

17

18
19

20

Wendy Doniger & Brian K. Smith, The Laws of Manu 225-226(1991).
Kamandaki, The Nitisara (Rajendra L. Mitra ed., 1982).
M.Z. Siddiqi, The Intelligence Services under the Mughals,in Medieval India: A
Miscellany 253, 260 (1972).
C.A. Bayly, empire and Information : Intelligence Gathering and Social
Communication in India, 1780-1870 10 (1997).
Id.at 13.
See Sir William Muir , Records of the Intelligence Department of the government of the North-West provinces of India during the Mutiny of 1857(1902).
Id.
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of Military operations and Intelligence. 21 It is during this time that earliest
versions of the laws governing surveillance were first drafted. In one form or
another, these laws have managed to survive into present day and continue
to guide the State in exercising control over its citizens’ speech.
Modern forms of surveillance trace their origins to §5 of the Indian
Telegraph Act, 1885. It was the first legislation that sought to lay down the
conditions for conducting surveillance and intercepting communications.
While the substantive conditions precedent for intercepting communications remained the same, the Act in its original form lacked any safeguards
against misuse of the provisions. §5(1) of the Act authorised the Governor
General in Council or an officer authorised by him to take temporary possession of or intercept and detain any telegraphic communication on the
occurrence of a public emergency or in the interest of public safety. 22 Unlike
the present Telegraph Act, however, there was no requirement for recording written reasons for intercepting the communication. Moreover, §5(2) of
the Act clarified that if there was any doubt about the existence of a public
emergency or a threat to public safety a “certificate signed by the Secretary
to the Government of India or to the Local Government would be conclusive
proof upon that point.”23 This provision barred judicial review of an action
taken by a delegated administrative official of the government under the Act.
The next legislation that sought to further expand the powers of the State
for intercepting communications was the Indian Post office Act of 1898.
Drafted thirteen years after the enactment of the Telegraph Act, it borrowed
heavily from the language of §5. The Post office Act under §26(1), however,
included one additional safeguard that an order for interception had to be
made in writing. The Select Committee instituted to examine the vires of
the Post office Bill had differing opinions regarding the powers granted
to the government under the Bill. 24 Shri P. Ananda Charlu, a member of
the Select Committee, noted his dissent highlighting the arbitrariness of
the power granted to the government under the Bill. Charlu, in particular,
pointed out that the bill lacked a provision mandating that an individual be
notified if his/her communication was intercepted but no charges pressed.
21

22

23
24

Constitution of Central Board of Information: Thorne’s report on war-time control of
press, broadcasting, films and publicity(1939) in Sanjoy Bhattacharya, British Military
Information Management Techniques and the South Asian Soldier: Eastern India during
the Second World War, 34 (2) Modern Asian Studies 483-510 (2000).
§5(1), Unamended Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 adopted by the Governor General in Council
on July 22, 1885 available at http://lawmin.nic.in/legislative/textofcentralacts/1885.pdf
(Last visited on Aug. 18, 2016).
Id. at §5(2).
Gazette of India, March 12, 1898, part V, in Law Commission Report No. 38 on the
Indian Post office Act.
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he noted that disclosures regarding interception may act as a deterrent to
future offenders. Consequently, he went on to suggest that the lack thereof
tilted the balance heavily in favour of the government and against the public. he also cautioned that the lack of safeguards would render the Bill open
to misuse by a corrupt government in the future.25 Shri Bisambar Nath,
another Indian member of the Council, also noted his apprehensions by suggesting that without due clarity regarding the conditions for existence of a
public emergency, the power prescribed by the Bill was arbitrary. 26 The Bill
was, nevertheless, passed without any amendments or the addition of any
safeguards.
The Telegraph Act and the Post office Act (hereinafter “the Acts”) continued to remain in operation even after the country gained independence.
During this time there was little to no recorded discourse on the lack of safeguards under the Acts except a Press Laws enquiry Committee in 1947. The
Committee only recommended that §§26 and 5 of the respective Acts should
be amended so that actions and orders of subordinate officers are reported to
and reviewed by responsible ministers of the government. 27 The first comprehensive examination of the Acts was undertaken by the Law Commission in
its 38th Report on the Indian Post office Act in 1968. The Law Commission
was of the opinion that insofar as §26 of the Post office Act intercepted or
detained one’s communication, it was a restriction on the freedom of speech
and expression guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution. 28 Therefore,
for interception to be permissible under §26, the rationale for such interception must be within the ambit of limitations prescribed under Article 19(2).
once again the Law Commission voiced concerns regarding the vagueness
of the term ‘public emergency’. It noted that if the emergency was not of such
a character as to threaten public order or the security of the State, then it
would go beyond the restrictions mentioned in the Constitution.29 To that
end, the Law Commission proposed an amendment to §26 of the Post office
Act and §5 of the Telegraph Act. It suggested that an order for interception
must only be passed if it was “required in the interests of the security of the
State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing the incitement to the commission of any offence.”30 This, in the Law

25

26
27

28
29
30

Gazette of India, March 26, 1898, part VI, 285-287, in Law Commission Report No. 38
on the Indian Post office Act.
Id.
Virendra Kumar, Report of the Press Laws Enquiry Committee, 1947 in Committees
and Commissions in India 1947-54, Volume I (2004).
Law Commission of India, 38thLaw Commission Report ¶83 (1968).
Id.
Law Commission of India, supra note 28 at ¶93.
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Commission’s opinion, would go a long way in making the Acts compatible
with the Constitution.
The Commission also considered §26(2) of the Post office Act that barred
judicial review after an administrative determination of the need for interception. The Commission found this provision to be wholly unconstitutional. It recorded that vires of an interference with freedom of expression
had to be examined on the basis of whether the interference fell afoul of the
limitations set out in the Constitution.31 This determination could only be
done by a court of law. The Commission therefore directed the government
to omit the provision from the Acts.
Following the Law Commission’s recommendation to amend the
Telegraph Act, the legislature passed the Telegraph (Amendment) Act,
1972. The amendment repealed the erstwhile §§26(2) and 5(2) of the Acts.
orders of interception were now subject to judicial review.32 Additionally,
the legislature sought to bring the Acts within the ambit of restrictions laid
down under Article 19(2). Following the Law Commission’s recommendations, many of the restrictions listed under Article 19(2) were imported into
§5(2) of the Telegraph Act.33 It may be interesting to note here that the Law
Commission had recommended the addition of a provision that authorised
interception only if it was required under the conditions set out in Article
19(2).34 This meant that interception orders could be passed only if it was
absolutely necessary to do so. however, the provisions were amended to
provide that communications could be intercepted if it was ‘necessary or
expedient’.35 Thus, an additional dimension of vagueness i.e. ‘expediency’
was included in the already ambiguous provisions for interception. The consequences of this ambiguity in drafting have been discussed in the later parts
of this paper. This paper, however, is not the first time that this lack of legislative clarity has been called into question.
The parliamentary debates surrounding the amendment reflected grave
concerns regarding the arbitrariness in conferring powers, and ambiguity in
language of the Act. The tenor of discussion reflected that the powers vested

31
32
33

34
35

Law Commission of India, supra note 28 at ¶86.
The Indian Telegraph (Amendment) Act, 1972, §5.
The amendment mandated that in addition to the existence of a public emergency and a
threat to public safety, the State would have to be satisfied that it was necessary or expedient in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State,
friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for preventing incitement to the
commission of an offence to pass an order of interception.
Law Commission of India, supra note 28.
The Indian Telegraph (Amendment) Act, 1972, §5(1).
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in the State under §5(2) were largely considered “excessive”36 when a proclamation of emergency was not in effect. Concerns were also voiced regarding
the lack of definition of the terms used in the Act.37 It was also feared that
the provisions may cause difficulties in centre-state relationships. A conflict
of opinion could arise between the government at the centre and the government at the state. In such a case the central government, which controls
the Telegraph Department, would be in a position to create hindrances in
dissemination of information from the state to other parts of the country. 38
In the Rajya Sabha it was pointed out that terms like public emergency had
not been defined in the Constitution. Therefore, it was not a reasonable
restriction on freedom of speech and expression.39 It was also cautioned that
even the legitimate use of public emergency for interception left the provision
open to misuse. While public emergency could be construed to be a special
circumstance requiring exigent action, protection of public safety was a continuing concern. Therefore, even in cases where an emergent situation did
not exist, interception orders could be passed by claiming that it was in the
interest of public safety.40
All of the aforementioned concerns raised in the parliament were either
unaddressed or brushed aside as trivial by Shri h.N. Bahuguna, the then
Union Minister of Communications. he insisted that terms like public emergency had been derived from within the Constitution and were therefore
valid restrictions on fundamental rights.41 In response to the potential misuse of the provisions, the hon’ble Minister claimed that there had been no
reported cases of misuse and therefore it was unlikely that it would happen
in the future.42 What the hon’ble Minister failed to acknowledge, however,
was that without adequate safeguards and any provision for post-interception disclosures, no cases of misuse would ever be brought into the public eye. Moreover, even if it were found to be true that no misuse of §5(2)
had occurred till 1972, this fact would not in itself preclude the possibility
of misuse of the Section in the future. The hon’ble Minister’s claims were
therefore a falsification of existing facts at worst or a moral high ground fallacy at best. Thus, despite numerous misgivings regarding the powers being
36

37
38
39

40
41

42

Parliamentary Debates, Lok Sabha, 09 August 1972, 218 (Shri Dinen Bhattacharyya,
Member of Parliament) (Ind.).
Id. at 219.
Parliamentary Debates, supra note 36 at 219.
Parliamentary Debates, Rajya Sabha, 31 July 1972, 268 (Shri Salil Kumar Ganguly,
Member of Parliament) (Ind.).
Id. at 264.
Parliamentary Debates, Lok Sabha, 09 August 1972, 228 (Shri h.N. Bahuguna, Minister
of Communications) (Ind.).
Parliamentary Debates, Rajya Sabha, 31 July 1972, 266 (Shri h.N. Bahuguna, Minister of
Communications) (Ind.).
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vested under the Act, the government Bill was passed in both the houses
of the Parliament. For nearly two decades thereafter, there are no records
of any judicial or legislative consideration of the ambiguity in surveillance
laws. What is clear, however, is that during this time the interception provisions were used extensively by the government.43 often, such orders of
interception were alleged to have been passed unjustly and in furtherance of
political motives rather than in public interest.44 It therefore became apparent that surveillance powers of the State could no longer be allowed to operate unbridled and without due procedure.
The year 1997 proved to be a watershed moment in the history of surveillance law. That year a division bench of the Supreme Court passed an
order in People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (hereinafter
“PUCL”)45 and added a slew of procedural safeguards to interception under
§5(2). In PUCL, a PIL was filed challenging the constitutionality of §5 of the
Telegraph Act. The contention of the petitioner was that there had been no
procedural rules laid down under §7(2)(b) of the Act which gives the State
the power to lay down precautions against improper interception and disclosure of messages. This had led to rampant misuse of the power of interception. The Court affirmed that tapping of telephones was indeed a breach
of privacy and a restriction on free speech. It was therefore a restriction on
rights guaranteed under both Articles 21 and 19 of the Constitution. Any
order of interception would be illegal if it was not passed as per the due
procedure of law. To that end, the Supreme Court suggested procedural safeguards to make the process of interception more transparent and uniform. It
also suggested the setting up of a review committee to analyse every order of
interception on the basis of certain criteria. As a result of this decision, the
legislature included Rule 419A to the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951 in the
year 2007. Rule 419A reiterates the suggestions that were given in PUCL.
The judgment in PUCL streamlined to a great extent the procedure for conducting surveillance. however, the substantive infirmities in the law, that
had been pointed out time and again, fell through the cracks of this historic
judgment. Concerns such as the excessiveness of powers granted to administrative authorities and lack of oversight etc. have not yet been considered by
Indian courts. The next part of this paper draws attention to some of these
substantive infirmities.
43

44
45

See generally, People’s Union for Civil Liberties, Mail and Telephone Censorship(1982)
available at http://www.pucl.org/from-archives/Media/mail-phone.htm(A chronicle of the
various allegations of misuse of the interception provisions by the government and the
resultant protests against this misuse.) (Last visited on Aug. 18, 2016).
Chawla, supra note 13.
People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301 : AIR 1997 SC 568,
¶ 35.
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§5(2)

Any Act that restricts the fundamental rights guaranteed to a citizen must
be in accordance with procedure validly established by the law. Such procedure must be “fair, just and reasonable and non-arbitrary, non-fanciful or non-oppressive.”46 The contention in PUCL was with regards to
the lack of adequate procedure for conducting surveillance. however, the
Constitutional vires of §5(2) was not “seriously challenged.”47 So far, there
has been no judicial determination of whether the conditions for authorising
surveillance are arbitrary or oppressive. Therefore, while the procedure for
conducting surveillance has been detailed with relative clarity, the prerequisites for authorisation of surveillance are yet to be explicated.
Authorisation for interception is still granted on the basis of conditions
that had been laid down over a century ago. §5(2) outlines a two-tiered test
that must be satisfied for the interception of telegraphs. The first-tier consists
of sine qua non 48 in the form of an ‘occurrence of public emergency’ or ‘in
the interest of public safety’. An officer passing an order must first establish
the existence of either one of the two conditions. Thereafter he must undertake an examination of whether it is necessary or expedient in the interest
of public order or national security to pass an order of interception. There
are, however, no objective criteria prescribed in the Acts on the basis of
which an authority is meant to arrive at these conclusions. he must, in that
case, necessarily arrive at these findings on a discretionary assessment of the
facts and circumstances. The power under the Act has not been vested in a
judicial authority but an administrative one. If the power had been vested
in a judicial or Constitutional authority, there would have been a presumption of legitimate use of the power. For instance, in Babulal Parate v. State
of Maharashtra, it was held that when a power is conferred on a judicial
authority it can be assumed that the power would be exercised legitimately
and honestly.49 A similar decision regarding a Constitutional authority was
arrived at in Accountant General v. S. Doraiswamy.50 Under the Telegraph
and Post office Acts, the power to suspend a person’s fundamental rights
has been left to the discretionary assessment of an administrative official.
46

47

48
49
50

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; State of Maharashtra v. Bharat
Shanti Lal Shah, (2008) 13 SCC 5.
People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC 301 : AIR 1997 SC 568
¶ 34.
Hukam Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India, (1976) 2 SCC 128.
Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 884 : (1961) 3 SCR 423.
Accountant General v. S. Doraiswamy, (1981) 4 SCC 93 : (1981) 2 SCR 155. (It was held
that the Comptroller and Auditor General being a high ranking Constitutional authority
can be expected to act without arbitrariness and a discretionary power conferred on him
does not violate the principle against excessive delegation.).
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Some of the specific aspects of §5 that are vague and indeterminate are discussed herein.

A. On the Occurrence of Public Emergency
The term ‘public emergency’ has been in operation within the Telegraph
Act since its very inception. It has remained the focal point of controversy
relating to the arbitrariness of the interception powers. The major concern
surrounding ‘public emergency’ is that the term has not been defined by the
legislature.51 hence the determination of whether public emergency exists can
often fall to a delegated administrative official. The term ‘public emergency’
and all orders for interception arising out of it shall be deemed to be arbitrary unless it can hold up against a test of constitutionality. In other words,
for public emergency to continue to remain in operation in the Act, it must
be established that the existence of public emergency is one of the conditions
envisaged in the Constitution for restricting fundamental rights. Questions
regarding the elusive definition of public emergency were raised during the
passing of the Indian Telegraph (Amendment) Act, 1972. In response, it was
claimed in the Parliament that the basis of the terms appearing in the Act
could be located within the Constitution.52 Thus, public emergency could be
a valid ground for restricting freedom of speech and expression. This, however, is not true. Although the Constitution uses the term ‘emergency’, it does
not mention the phrase ‘public emergency’. For Bahuguna’s claims to find
any credence, public emergency would have to be taken to mean the same as
a proclamation of emergency or any other form of emergency mentioned in
the Constitution. Both, the Second Press Commission in 1952 and the Law
Commission in its 38th Report in 1968 attempted to discern the meaning of
‘public emergency’ but failed to arrive at an exhaustive definition. The Law
Commission acknowledged that the phrase public emergency is very broad
and §§26 and 5 of the Acts contemplate interception of communications
during peaceful times as well.53 The Press Commission clarified that public emergency need not be confined to an emergency arising out of war or
external aggression. It may arise locally and yet it may have repercussions in
other parts of the country.54 Moreover, the Indian Telegraph Act was drafted
nearly six decades before the Constitution of India was brought into force. It
is inconceivable to imagine that a law drafted in the 19th century was meant
to be synonymous with a proclamation of emergency. Further, conceiving
51
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public emergency as a proclamation of emergency may even create additional barriers in the implementation of the law. By way of illustration, let us
consider the argument that public emergency is the same as a proclamation
of emergency. Then, any requests by law enforcement agencies to intercept
communications would require them to establish that a state of emergency
exists. This is an extremely high threshold to meet. Instead, law enforcement
agencies would find it easier to establish that public safety is threatened and
requires the interception of communications. over time this would cause the
phrase ‘public emergency’ to become redundant. Public emergency therefore
cannot be conflated with a proclamation of emergency.
The only guidance to the possible meaning of ‘public emergency’ came
from the Supreme Court in hukam Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India
(hereinafter “hukam Chand”).55 Therein, a four judge bench of the Supreme
Court defined ‘public emergency’ as a situation “which raises problems concerning the interest of the public safety, the sovereignty and integrity of India,
the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order
or the prevention of incitement to the commission of an offence.”56 This definition seemingly brings public emergency into the ambit of the restrictions
laid down under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. In reality, though, it does
not lend any clarity to the indeterminacy surrounding the term.
Firstly, both public emergency and public safety are envisaged as conditions precedent to the exercise of power under §5. In this regard the Court
was correct in holding that the two phrases must take their colour off each
other. But interpreting public emergency as a situation that must necessarily
implicate public safety does not assist in delineation of the term. Instead, it
renders the term ‘public emergency’ redundant. The fact that the two terms
have been separately included in the Act means that they must necessarily
refer to two distinct situations.57 Granted, that situations may arise where
both public emergency and public safety overlap; however there must necessarily be situations where a public emergency has arisen but public safety
is not threatened. By way of illustration, an imminent strike that may cease
operation of transportation services may be an emergent situation affecting
the public while not necessarily threatening the safety of the public. This
would then qualify as a public emergency but would not implicate public
safety.
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Secondly, the Act envisages public emergency as a sine qua non before a
threat to sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly
relations with foreign States or public order exists. The Supreme Court’s
interpretation seeks to define public emergency as a situation where public
order, sovereignty and security of the State are already threatened. This is a
cyclic interpretation of §5 where it is difficult to understand whether a threat
to public order and security create a condition of public emergency or vice
versa.
There are therefore no objective criteria against which the existence of
public emergency can be measured. Thus, the question of the existence of a
public emergency is left to the subjective determination of a delegated official. The question that arises at this juncture is whether the subjective assessment by a delegated administrative official is sufficient for the suspension of
fundamental rights. A similar question arose before the house of Lords in
Liversidge v. Anderson.58 The case examined the vires of an Act that vested
an administrative authority with the power to detain a person if there was
reasonable cause to believe that the person was of hostile origin. Lord Atkin
in his dissenting opinion weighed in on the conditions set out for the power
in question to be exercised. Relying on Greene v. Secy. of State for home
Affairs, 59 he was of the opinion that the precondition of “a reasonable cause
to believe” was one requiring subjective determination and not an objective one. Further, the power that was meant to be vested in the administrative official was a conditional one. however, by allowing an administrative
authority himself to determine whether he was entitled to use his power, the
law had the effect of vesting in him an absolute authority instead of a conditional one. In such cases, the only protection available against misuse of such
power was the belief that the official was acting in good faith. This proposition was unacceptable to Lord Atkin. he opined that any law that lays down
preconditions for the exercise of a certain power but lacks objective criteria
to test whether the preconditions have been met is unsustainable. Although,
Lord Atkin’s judgment formed the dissenting opinion, it has since emerged
as the more logically defensible position.60
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A similar position was also taken by the Supreme Court in State of M.P.
v. Baldeo Prasad.61 The case dealt with the constitutionality of the Central
Provinces and Berar Goondas Act, 1946 and the lack of the definition of
Goondas under the Act. While deeming the statute as unconstitutional, the
Court held that a statute must provide adequate safeguards for the protection of innocent citizens. It must also require the administrative authority
to be satisfied as to the existence of the conditions precedent laid down in
the statute before making an order. If the statute failed to do so in respect
of any condition precedent, then the law suffered from an infirmity and was
liable to be struck down as invalid. Similarly, public emergency has not been
defined under the Telegraph Act. Moreover, the legislature has also failed to
lay down any objective criteria that may guide the administrative authority
in coming to a conclusion regarding the existence of public emergency. This
view also finds support from the findings of the Second Press Commission.
The Press Commission acknowledged the vague nature of public emergency
and its potential to be misused by delegated officials. It was of the opinion
that the appropriate government should declare the existence of a public
emergency by a notification warranting the exercise of the power under §5.
only after the issue of such a notification would the delegated authority
be able to exercise the power of withholding telegraphic messages.62 This,
however, is not a practical solution. In exigent cases where an order of interception may need to be urgently issued, it may be impossible to obtain a
declaration of public emergency from the appropriate government. A more
plausible solution may be a clearer definition of the term.
It is now evident that the definition of ‘public emergency’ is vague at best.
Any law that seeks to restrict the fundamental rights of individuals must be
fair, just, reasonable and non-arbitrary.63As the law stands today, the determination of a condition of public emergency is left to the arbitrary decision
of a delegated authority. hence, the occurrence of a public emergency is
not a valid ground for interception of communications and consequently for
restricting freedom of speech and expression. In its current form, it is therefore ultra vires the constitution and liable to be struck down.
Unfortunately, Indian laws provide little guidance in discerning a non-exclusionary meaning of the term. The only statute that uses the term ‘public
emergency’, not in the context of surveillance, is the Factories Act, 1948.64
This ‘public emergency’, however, is limited only to an emergency whereby
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the security of India is threatened, by war or external aggression or internal
disturbance.65 The Supreme Court has already held that public emergency
cannot be equated with any other form of emergency.66 hence, other statutes
using the term ‘emergency’67 may not provide any guidance in the interpretation of this term. It may, therefore, be necessary to look beyond the
Indian legal system to understand what the phrase means. In the context of
protection of human rights, the european Court of human Rights (hereinafter “eCthR”) has attempted to define ‘public emergency’. In Lawless
v. Ireland,68 it defined the phrase as “an exceptional situation of crisis or
emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to
the organised life of the community of which the State is composed.”69 This
definition was further developed by the eCthR in the Greek Case.70 In that
matter the Court further clarified the term to having been said to exist only
when a threat is actual or imminent and the effects of emergency involve the
whole nation. Further, the continuance of the organised life of the community must be threatened for a declaration of public emergency. It was also
held that the crisis or danger must be so exceptional that the normal measures or restrictions, permitted by european Convention on human Rights
for the maintenance of public safety, health and order, must have proven
to be inadequate.71 Admittedly, the pronouncements by the eCthR are in
the context of derogation of national responsibility in relation to human
rights under emergent circumstances. These definitions therefore cannot be
directly imported into Indian surveillance laws.
When delineating a power that is exercised for regular law enforcement,
the Act cannot rely on a definition that necessitates the existence of ‘exceptional’ social conditions. Instead, Indian courts must strive to arrive at a
more balanced definition. It is entirely possible to define public emergency
under the Acts without relying on principles of public order or public safety.
A good starting point can be the classification of criminal acts as those that
threaten national security and those that do not. A near inclusive list of
threats to national security could then be said to cause a public emergency,
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while everything else would only threaten public safety. Any such classification must then necessarily be followed by different rules of procedure for
reacting to the different classes of threats. In fact, such a distinction may be
the only thing that helps §5(2) of the Telegraph Act retain its constitutionality when the matter comes for consideration before the courts.

B. Expedient in the Interest of National Security and
Public order
Another point of concern that raises doubts about the Constitutionality of
§5 of the Telegraph act is the use of the word ‘expedient’ for authorising an
interception. The Law Commission in its 38th Report suggested that surveillance should be undertaken only if it was necessary under one of the grounds
listed in Article 19(2).72 The legislature however amended the Act in a manner so that communications could be intercepted if it was either necessary
or expedient to do so. The meaning of the term expedient is not res integra.
It has been defined to mean something that is apt or suitable to the end in
view.73 It can be also taken to mean something that is either practical and
efficient or advantageous.74 In other circumstances it can be understood as
a device “characterised by mere utility rather than principle, conducive to
special advantage rather than to what is universally right.”75
In light of these definitions, it is fairly simple to conclude that the burden for determining an act of interception as expedient is much lower than
determining it as necessary. This essentially means that the State can choose
to intercept a person’s communication if it finds such interception an efficient means of obtaining communication. The term ‘expedient’ therefore,
prima facie seems at odds with Rule 419-A(3) of the Indian Telegraph Rules,
1951. Rule 419-A(3) States that an administrative authority shall only pass
an order of interception when it is not possible to obtain the information
by any other reasonable means. however, the use of the term ‘expedient’
gives the authority the power to intercept communication even on the mere
satisfaction that it is efficient or advantageous to do so. The power to determine whether it is expedient in the interest of public order, security and
sovereignty of the State to intercept and detain communications therefore
seems arbitrary and falls afoul of the constitutional principles of just, fair
and non-arbitrary.
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WITH STANDARDS OF ENFORCEMENT

The surveillance set up under the Telegraph Act and Post office Act suffers
not only from substantive infirmities but also from institutional ones. one
of the imminent concerns is regarding the severe lack of oversight of the surveillance set up. In accordance with the court’s direction in PUCL, Rule 419A(16) provides for the establishment of a three member Review Committee.
This Committee consists of the Cabinet or Chief Secretary and two other
Secretaries of the Centre or State Government as the case may be. According
to Rule 419-A(17), this Review Committee shall meet at least once every
two months. The mandate of the Committee is to review whether the orders
passed under sub-rule (1)76 are in accordance with §5(2) of the Telegraph
Act. Therefore, the Review Committee, after considering all relevant facts
and circumstances, is meant to review whether a public emergency or a
threat to public safety existed at the time of passing of the order. Further it
must, after judicial application of mind, come to a conclusion about whether
or not it was in the interest of public order, national security or sovereignty
or protection of friendly relations with foreign States to pass the order of
interception. A recent application under the Right to Information Act to
the Ministry of home Affairs has revealed that on an average 7500 to 9000
orders for interception are issued every month by the Central Government
alone.77 Therefore, if the Review Committee meets once every two months
as it is statutorily mandated to do, then it would have to consider and dispose off between 15000 to 18000 orders of interception at every meeting.
If, on the other hand, the Review Committee were to meet every day of the
month it would have to dispose off between 290-345 orders. It is inconceivable that any three member body would be able to take into account all the
relevant facts and circumstances surrounding 290 orders of interception in a
day, let alone 18000. It is therefore clear that either the Review Committee
undertakes its task in an extremely cursory manner or fails to even consider
the vast majority of cases. If this is the case then despite the existence of
Rule 419-A (16), India lacks any effective oversight of orders of surveillance.
hence, orders of interception passed under §5(2) are issued without any judicial scrutiny and even after their issuance are not subjected to any form
of review. Therefore, a vast number of people whose communications are
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wrongfully intercepted are never even made aware of the serious infringement of their privacy by the State.
Despite the lack of any protection against the violation of its citizens’
rights, India has been dangerously toeing the line that separates a democracy from a totalitarian surveillance State. In the last half a decade alone
the Government has introduced tools that increase its surveillance capabilities manifold. Two of the most controversial tools alleged to have already
been put into operation are the Central Monitoring System and the Network
Traffic Analysis System (hereinafter “NeTRA”). These projects have been
tightly kept under wraps by the Government and most of the information
available about them is speculative. Almost all the information available
about these projects can be attributed to anonymous bureaucratic sources
within the Government.78 however, from whatever little information is
available about these projects, they seem to fall within the ambit of the laws
in operation governing surveillance.
NeTRA has been developed by the Centre for Artificial Intelligence and
Robotics (hereinafter “CAIR”) laboratory at the Defence Research and
Development organisation (hereinafter “DRDo”). It appears to be designed
to monitor packetised data and voice traffic over the internet using keyword
searches.79 As a tool that employs keyword searches to intercept communications, it will conduct dragnet surveillance. This form of surveillance will not
discriminate between a malicious user and an innocent one, theoretically
putting the entire internet user network under surveillance. NeTRA, therefore, is a form of mass surveillance that will cause large scale breaches of privacy and unwarranted restriction on free speech and expression. Naturally,
it begs the question of where exactly a tool designed for mass surveillance of
a country’s own citizens stands legally?
As a tool meant to be used strictly for surveillance over the internet,
NeTRA must necessarily function within the limits of §§69 and 69B of
the Information Technology Act, 2000. §69 which is analogous to §5 of
the Telegraph Act provides for interception of communication transmitted
via a computer resource.80 The procedure for intercepting communication
transmitted over the internet has been laid down under the Information
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Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Interception, Monitoring and
Decryption of Information) Rules, 2009 (hereinafter “Decryption Rules”).
Rule 9 of the Decryption Rules states that the direction of interception shall
be with regard to any information that is sent to or from any person or class
of persons or relating to any particular subject matter.81 This is a significant
departure from the interception that is allowed under the Telegraph and Post
office Acts. The Telegraph and Post office Acts also allow the interception
of communication relating to a person or a class of persons as well as any
subject matter. however, owing to the physical nature of communication
under the ambit of the Acts, only the communication of clearly identifiable
individuals would be intercepted. Under the Decryption Rules, all persons
over a computer network engaging in communication about a monitored
subject matter would be brought under the ambit of surveillance. Therefore,
the Decryption Rules authorise dragnet surveillance instead of targeted
surveillance. The legality of this provision allowing bulk surveillance has
not been called into question before Indian courts. however, as the matter stands, bulk surveillance is legally authorised in this country. A similar
challenge that recently arose before the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in the
UK does not inspire much optimism either. In Privacy International v. Govt.
Communications headquarters (hereinafter “GChQ”), the legality of the
GChQ’s involvement in the mass surveillance under the NSA’s PRISM program and other similar activities was called into question.82 The Tribunal
considered the question of whether the practice of bulk data collection was
permissible under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000 (hereinafter “RIPA”). Under the RIPA, §8(1) permits interception relating to
only one person or one premise.83 however, U/§ 8(4) non-targeted surveillance is also allowed so long as a warrant is obtained to that effect from the
Secretary of State. While weighing in on the actions of GChQ, the Tribunal
said that it did not believe that §8(4) authorised bulk or mass surveillance
and that such interception would be illegal.84 It also rationalised GChQ’s
position by stating that the espionage organisation’s actions could not be
called indiscriminate bulk surveillance, rather they should be considered
“discriminate but vast”85 surveillance. here, the Tribunal while couching it
81
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in slightly more politically correct terms has, in fact, indirectly given intelligence organisations a carte blanche to continue expanding their powers of
interception. It is a legitimate fear that if the vires of the Decryption Rules
are brought into question before the courts, a similar line of reasoning may
be applied thus buttressing the perhaps already prevalent practice of dragnet
surveillance.
As has been previously argued, communications can be intercepted on
the mere belief that it is expedient in the interest of public order or national
security. It has become apparent from the preceding discussion that the laws
governing surveillance are not only archaic and ambiguous but also, in some
cases, misguided. over the last decade, the State instead of proactively modernising these legislations has been involved in creation of newer tools for
restricting fundamental freedoms. In light of these developments, a serious
revaluation of the existing laws has become imperative. The next part of
the paper briefly discusses some practices that may be adopted to improve
surveillance practices and minimise misuse.

VI. SUGGESTED

BEST PRACTICES FOR SURVEILLANCE

Legal provisions governing surveillance and interception of communication
in India are far from ideal. The very first infirmity that the legal setup suffers
from is that the laws governing surveillance are outdated. The Information
Technology Act, 2000 only regulates interception of communications
transmitted over a computer network. The laws governing interception in
other spheres are still archaic. Since the coming into force of the Telegraph
Act there has been a sea change in technology that can remotely intercept
communications over a telephone network. In 2012, the Department of
Telecommunications issued a recall order for thousands of sophisticated
phone interception devices that had been imported during the open general
license regime.86 These devices can remotely listen in and intercept phone
conversations within a radius of two kilometres. It is believed that nearly
90% of these interceptors (codenamed FoX) had been purchased by private companies. however, despite the recall order, not one corporate entity
declared that it was in possession of these devices.87 Surveillance technologies
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have moved far beyond the limitations that a hundred and thirty year old
law could possibly impose on them. It is not just the government that possesses the capability of intercepting communications anymore. In spite of
this, there have been no steps to draft specialised laws that protect citizens’
privacy and insulate them from unauthorised surveillance either by the State
or by private individuals. While almost all developed and developing countries have drafted progressive laws to enhance and better regulate their interception capabilities, India continues to be governed by an archaic law. This
part exposits some aspects of the modern surveillance laws adopted globally,
and discusses their viability in the Indian context.
one of the primary problems with Indian surveillance law is the executive
authorisation model for intercepting communications. Both surveillance88
and interception of one’s communication89 are a restriction on one’s fundamental rights. They can therefore only be undertaken with due regard
to procedure established by law. The right to privacy has been called too
“broad and moralistic”90 to be defined judicially. Any claim arising out of a
violation of this right must be analysed on a case-to-case basis.91 Therefore
by necessary corollary, any restriction imposed on the right must also be
determined with regards to the particular facts and circumstances of a case.
An order of surveillance can impinge upon the right to privacy and impose
a chilling effect on free speech. every such order must be tested against the
limits set under Article 19 of the Constitution. This determination can only
be done adequately by a judicial officer and not by an executive authority. It is
for this reason that almost all countries with specialised legislations for preventing unlawful surveillance have favoured a judicial sanction model over
an executive authorisation one. In Australia, for instance, warrants for intercepting communications are granted by a judge or a nominated member of
the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.92 The Australian Telecommunications
Interception and Access Act also clearly identifies which judges and nominated members are authorised to issue such warrants. In case of the nominated member, such member must have been enrolled as a legal practitioner
of either a Supreme Court or a federal court for not less than five years.93 It
is only in case of an application for interception by the Australian Security
Intelligence organisation that a warrant is not required from a judge or
a nominated member. But even so, a warrant must be obtained from the
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Attorney General after judicial application of mind.94 In Brazil, wiretapping is regulated by the Federal Law No. 9,296. Under this law, authorisation for interception is granted on a judge’s order for a period of 15 days
at a time. Moreover, interception is only allowed for investigations into
serious offences like drug smuggling, corruption, murder and kidnapping.
The Canadian Criminal Code, 1985 which governs general rules of criminal
procedure including search and seizure protocols, also favours the judicial
sanction model. Under the Code, interception orders can only be issued by
a provincial court judge or a judge of the superior court.95 Similarly, in the
United States, authorisation for interception can be granted by a District
Court or a federal appeals court on application by a law enforcement officer
duly signed by the Attorney General.96 In France, the civilian law governing
video surveillance and interception of communication also requires previous authorization from an investigating judge after consultation with the
Public Prosecutor.97 This reflects a clear lean in favour of letting the judiciary
allow or disallow requests for interception of communications. The executive authorisation model, however, also finds some takers.
When it comes to authorising orders for interception, the United Kingdom,
like India, goes against the grain. The UK has consistently followed an
executive authorisation model for intercepting communications. Under the
RIPA, UK grants authorisation for interception in the form of a warrant
by the Secretary of State or in certain special cases by a senior officer.98 It
may be interesting to note here that most countries that have not drafted
specialised legislations governing interception or have chosen to adopt the
executive authorisation model are former colonies of the United Kingdom.99
Telecommunications regulation in most of these countries is still governed
by colonial laws. This may be attributed either to a lack of recognition of
the right to privacy100 or due to inadequate sensitisation of the citizens about
State sanctioned surveillance.
94
95
96

97

98
99

100

Telecommunications Interception and Access Act, 1979, §9.
Canadian Criminal Code, 1885, §184.2.
electronic Communications Privacy Act, 1986 under Title III, omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act, §18.
Loid’orientation et de programmation pour la performance de la sécuritéintérieure
(LoPPSI 2), 2011, Article 36.
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000, §7.
See generally, Privacy International’s Country Reports on Iraq, Jordan, Malaysia, Sri
Lanka and Bangladesh available at https://www.privacyinternational.org/resources/
reports (Last visited on Aug. 18, 2016).
Privacy and Human Rights Report, 2006 for the Republic of Sri Lanka available at http://
www.worldlii.org/int/journals/ePICPrivhR/2006/PhR2006-Republic-28.html
(The
Sri Lankan Constitution does not explicitly recognize a right to personal privacy. The
Country also lacks any specialized data protection framework) (Last visited on Aug. 18,
2016).

232

The INDIAN JoURNAL oF LAW AND TeChNoLoGy

Vol. 12

exceptions however do exist. of the countries that gained independence
on a comparative time scale as India, only three have managed to draft specialised laws regulating interception. All three of these countries have opted
for a judicial sanction model for intercepting communication. South Africa,
having gained independence in 1931, drafted the Regulation of Interception
of Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information
Act in 2002. Under this law, a warrant for intercepting communications
and installing surveillance devices is granted by a designated judge.101 Such
warrant is issued on satisfaction of the judge that the investigation relates to
a serious offence or that the information gathering is vital to public health
or safety, national security or compelling national economic interests.102
Cyprus, that gained independence in 1960, drafted the Protection of Secrecy
of Private Communications (Call Interception) Law in 1996. Under this Law,
the Attorney General must file for a court order before using wiretaps.103 The
latest among the three countries to have modernised its surveillance laws is
Pakistan. There, the power of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to
intercept communications and undertake covert surveillance is governed by
the Investigation for Fair Trial Act, 2013. The Act provides for a two-tiered
supervisory model for authorising interception. Under §6 of the Act, every
application for interception must be placed before the Federal Minister for
Interior for his due consideration. It is only with the Minister’s permission
that the application can then be placed before a high Court Judge104 for the
issuance of a warrant.105
Modern tools and methods of conducting surveillance are complex and
highly specialised. Moreover, the contours of privacy laws have not been
well defined in India. Therefore, the determination of legitimate restrictions
on the law of privacy is no simple task that can be left to the discretionary
whims of a delegated administrative official. It is clear from the above discourse that in order to adequately regulate the practice of State sanctioned
surveillance, it is necessary that the determination of a need for surveillance
must be undertaken by the judiciary. The conditions listed under §5 of the
Telegraph Act for interception can only be assessed by a judicial application of mind. No delegated administrative official is competent to make that
determination. Therefore, warrants for ordering surveillance or intercepting
101
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Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related
Information Act, 2002, §16.
Id. §19(4).
Privacy International, Country Report on Cyprus (2012) available at https://www.
privacyinternational.org/resources/reports/cyprus#footnote1_1dd86bp (Last visited on
Aug. 18, 2016).
Investigation for Fair Trial Act, 2013, §9.
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communications must be issued by a Magistrate106 or either a sitting or
retired high Court Judge. In addition, laws governing surveillance must
also be updated to keep up with vast leaps in the technology of intercepting
communications. Some additional steps that can be taken to modernise the
surveillance set up in India have been discussed below.
Along with a long overdue overhaul of the regulatory framework for
interception, it is essential that the law must put in place adequate oversight
mechanisms to prevent misuse of the law. Sub-rule 16 of Rule 419A provides
for the establishment of a three-member Review Committee to review orders
of interception. It also mandates that the committee meet at least once every
two months. As has already been discussed, one meeting every two months
is not nearly enough to thoroughly review all the orders passed under §5(2)
of the Telegraph Act. The law should therefore mandate that the committee
meet more frequently to be able to give due consideration to every order.
Moreover, the constitution of the Review Committees has been limited to
secretaries serving within the government. This has the effect of expecting
the executive to conduct oversight on itself. Instead, it should be mandated
that every Review Committee must have at least one judicial member who
is independent of the government in power at the State or the Centre. In
addition to the judicial member, the Review Committee should also include
a member with technical expertise to deal with the increasingly complex
issues of electronic surveillance such as encryption. Further, while the Rules
provide some guidance with regards to duration for which intercepted data
shall be retained,107 they are completely silent with regards to inter-departmental sharing of such data. It is advisable that the legislature clarifies data
sharing provisions under the Act. These protections may go a long way in
helping reduce the misuse of surveillance powers by law enforcement and
intelligence agencies.

VII. CONCLUSION
Surveillance causes a serious breach of one’s privacy. Interception of communications restricts one’s freedom of speech and expression by inducing a
chilling effect. There have been proven cases of misuse of surveillance provisions in the past. With the invention of orwellian tools for monitoring the
lives of people, we have entered into a dangerous and uncharted territory.
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See Draft Privacy (Protection) Bill, 2013, §53 available at http://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/privacy-protection-bill-february-2014.pdf (Last visited on Aug. 18, 2016).
Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951, Rule 419-A(18).
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If the disclosures by former NSA employee edward Snowden caution us of
one thing then it is this: the State’s machinery cannot always be relied on to
act within the boundaries of law and display adequate respect for citizens’
rights. It, then, falls onto all the stakeholders involved to ensure that the
powers and functions of their correlative duty bearers are precisely defined.
This paper has attempted to draw attention to systemic ambiguities and
shortcomings in the existing legal regime. It has also attempted to highlight those aspects of the State’s machinery that are vulnerable to misuse. To
address these shortcomings, legislative and judicial authorities must not only
look ahead but also draw lessons from the past. Creating a progressive and
comprehensive legislation will only re-enact the failures from the past if the
endemic problems in implementation are not resolved.
The absolute first step must be to address the ambiguities and shortcomings in the existing laws. For instance, oversight provisions, where they exist,
must be strengthened, and where they don’t exist, must be introduced. The
Review Committee formed under Rule 419A has proven to be ineffective.
Its powers, functions and constitution must be updated to actually help it
discharge the duty it was established to discharge. The intelligence agencies that have been tasked with handling the information collection systems
have not been created under any legislation and are therefore not subject to
any parliamentary oversight. Attempts like the Intelligence Services (Powers
and Regulation) Bill, 2011108 have been shelved and not revisited since their
introduction. Intelligence agencies that have been created through executive
orders enjoy vast and unbridled powers that make them accountable to no
one. They are putting the surveillance powers to the exact same kind of
misuse109 as it was subjected to in the past110. Before vesting the Indian law
enforcement agencies with sensitive information that can be so readily misused, it is essential to ensure that a mechanism to check the use and misuse
of that power exists.111
The second step must be the creation of progressive laws. The fountainhead of the solutions to all of these problems is a clear delineation of the
right to privacy. A well-defined right to privacy will bring clarity to the focal
point at which the State’s power ends and a citizen’s right begins. It is well
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past time and the legislature and the courts should revisit the question of
specifically including a right to privacy within the fundamental rights.112
Additionally, the legislature must undertake the herculean task of drafting a
detailed and multidimensional legislation protecting physical, informational
and locational privacy of individuals. A privacy protection legislation can
do more than just delineate the scope of the right to privacy. It will help
identify specific rights holders whose privacy is sought to be protected. It
will assist in creating distinction between the privacy available to private
individuals and public individuals. This may help resolve the long standing
conflict between the right to privacy and freedom of speech and expression.
Moreover, a legislation providing a right to privacy will also help identify the
duty bearers who are obligated to not only deprive individuals of their privacy, but in certain cases even assist in the protection of the same.113 Lastly,
creating an explicit privacy legislation will also help dispel the erroneous
notion that privacy is a western concept and finds no basis in Indian law. It
will also help sensitise the citizenry about their right to privacy and inform
them against potential violations of the same.
over the last century, there have been very few attempts at redesigning
the declining surveillance infrastructure in the country. every single one of
those attempts has ended with suggestions for improvement and modernisation of these laws. each additional day that these draconian laws remain in
operation, people’s fundamental rights are threatened. however, we are now
at a critical juncture. Never before has the Indian Government possessed the
capability of restricting fundamental rights of the entire citizenry at once.
With systems like CMS and NeTRA possibly already in place, a legislative
re-examination of these laws and institution of additional safeguards cannot
come fast enough. Therefore, the one fact that becomes manifestly clear is
that the data protection regime and surveillance powers of the State require
a complete overhaul if even a vestige of privacy is sought to be protected.
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